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Since Hotelling’s (1929) seminal work, economists have tried to understand
how product differentiation affects price competition. I study the product loca-
tion decisions, on a vertical characteristic space, of two sets of horizontal com-
petitors when the inputs supplied by the ”upstream” set (the manufacturers) and
the input supplied by the ”downstream” set (the retailers) are combined one-to-
one to form a final good under the assumption that each manufacturer sells
through one retailer exclusively. I find that the final product provided by each
manufacturer-retailer pair shows maximum differentiation along one dimension
and minimum differentiation along the other (MaxMin equilibrium). I conduct
the same analysis under the assumption that each manufacturer sells to any re-
tailer and each retailer buys from any manufacturer. I find a Nash Equilibrium in
which each firm differentiates its product completely from its horizontal competi-
tor. Finally, I estimate the effect of advertising on consumer brand choice and
search behavior. Under imperfect information, advertising can affect consumer
behavior by providing economically relevant information in a convenient way. I
find that advertising has an increasing effect on consumers’ search effort and on
the probability of purchase associated with the featured brand.
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Since Hotelling’s (1929) seminal work, economists have tried to understand how
product differentiation affects price competition. In the following two chapters I
study the product location decisions, on a vertical characteristic space, of two sets
of horizontal competitors when the inputs supplied by the ”upstream” set (the
manufacturers) and the input supplied by the ”downstream” set (the retailers)
are combined one-to-one to form a final good.
The previous characterization captures many aspects of the relationship be-
tween manufacturers and retailers. Although it can be extended to other sectors,
I discuss the results as applied to the new-car market and the groceries one-stop
shopping market.
The economic function of any retail system is to provide consumers with a
set of distribution services associated with the explicit items or services bought
at retail. Typically, consumers cannot buy the distribution services provided by
a retailer separately from the good or goods that retailer sells to form a bundle
(“mix and match”). Thus, the location of any particular bundle on the product
space will depend, among other things, on how do the firms providing the goods
and the distribution services affect each other.
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I start the analysis in Chapter 2, by studying the product location and pricing
strategies of this set of retailers and manufacturers under the assumption that
each manufacturer sells through one retailer exclusively. I find that when the
affiliated manufacturers and retailers maximize profits independently from each
other, the final product provided by each manufacturer-retailer pair does not
show maximum differentiation along the product and distribution service vertical
dimensions.
In Chapter 3, I conduct the same analysis under the assumption that each
manufacturer sells to any retailer and each retailer buys from any manufacturer.
I find that a Nash Equilibrium in which each firm differentiates its product com-
pletely from its horizontal competitor. The equilibrium mimics the unique equi-
librium outcome in a game where each manufacturer and each retailer offer its
good to the consumers directly, and then each consumer does the bundling (mix
and match) at will.
Finally, in Chapter 4 I estimate the effect of advertising a set of brands and
their prices on consumer brand choice and search behavior.Under imperfect in-
formation, advertising can affect consumer behavior by providing economically
relevant information like price and other product characteristics in a convenient
way. I find that advertising has a increasing effect on consumers’ search effort and
an increasing effect on the probability of purchase associated with the featured
brand.
2
1.1 Vertical Differentiation and Oligopolistic Com-
petition Theory
Two streams of the literature are merged in the models presented in Chapter
2 and Chapter 3: the product differentiation literature and the vertical con-
trol/integration literature.
The product differentiation literature distinguishes between vertical differen-
tiation models (vector models in the marketing literature) and horizontal differ-
entiation models (ideal point models in the marketing literature).
The seminal paper in this field is Hotelling (1929). He showed that given a
price vector, firms have an incentive to locate in the same position. D’Aspremont
et al., (1979) modified the Hotelling model to show that when price competition
was considered, profit maximization led to maximal differentiation. They showed
that when we let each firm choose its product location, two forces determine the
location equilibrium. First, given prices, competition leads the two firms to locate
as closely as possible. Second, a strategic force leads the two firms to differentiate
from each other in order to diminish price competition.
Shaked and Sutton (1982) extended the analysis to consider vertical product
differentiation along one dimension. They proved that both forces are present
in the vertical product differentiation models and that they determine equilibria
where firms are located at the extreme ends of the vertical dimension support.
While the models mentioned above are one-dimensional models, dePalma et al
(1979), Neven and Thisse (1990), and Vandenbosch and Weinberg (1995), among
others, have extended the analysis of product differentiation to more than one
dimension. They all reach the conclusion that when two dimensions are con-
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sidered, the typical result is an equilibrium where firms maximally differentiate
themselves along one dimension and minimally differentiate along the other. So
in equilibrium they forgo part of the potential rents that could come from further
differentiation. This result is pervasive in the literature and has its own name,
the ”MaxMin” equilibrium.
In particular, Vandenbosch and Weinberg (1995) found that when the range




(Dmax−Dmin) ≤ 12881 , one firm locates at the maximum quality in both dimension
and the other at the maximum quality in one dimension and at the minimum
quality in the other dimension. As expected, the firm located at the highest
quality location in both dimensions earns the higher profits.
Again, there are two forces playing against each other in this model: a de-
mand force drawing the firms together and a strategic force that pushes firms to
differentiate. Specifically, if (S
max−Smin)
(Dmax−Dmin) ≥ 12881 , “. . . both firms want to have the
highest quality, but because the strategic force, only one firm [firm 2] will locate
there. The firm, which is unable to choose the highest quality position [firm 1],
differentiates its product by choosing the minimum quality on only one dimen-
sion because of the demand force. This choice reduces price competition while
at the same time maintains a sufficiently high quality level for the differentiating
firm’s product to appeal to a number of consumers.” Firm 1 differentiates in both
dimensions whenever the range of positioning options on each of the dimensions




The vertical control literature studies the strategic relationship between ”up-
stream” firms possessing monopoly power in an intermediate good market and
the ”downstream” firms demanding that good. As stated in Tirole (1988):
4
...[V]ertical relationships among firms are often much richer and more
complex than those between a firm and its consumers. Ordinary con-
sumers often just consume the good, but industrial consumers trans-
form the good and/or market it. In other words, some further deci-
sions are made after the intermediate good is sold by the upstream
firm. Because these decisions affect its profit, the upstream firm has
an incentive to control them. Beyond the pricing policy and the prod-
uct specification for its good, it will exert further vertical control on
downstream operations to the extent that such control is feasible.
The basic vertical framework is made of two firms. The ”upstream” firm, a sin-
gle monopolistic supplier producing an intermediate good, and the ”downstream”
firm, which is also a monopolist in the final good market. The ”downstream”
firm has a technology that transforms one unit of the intermediate good into one
unit of the final good. These two firms sign a contract specifying the terms of
their relationship. The literature on vertical control has focused extensively on
studying the implications of different contractual arrangements under this simple
environment.
In the next two chapters I study the interaction between a particular ver-




Vertical Product Differentiation under
Exclusivity: The new-car market
2.1 Introduction
Many manufacturers offer their products through independent dealers with whom
they maintain an exclusivity relationship. This is true in the new-car market as
well as in those for sewing machines, agricultural machinery, and gasoline.
In these markets, the manufacturer’s profit is affected by the dealer’s pricing
practices because the dealer’s mark-up determine the volume of final sales. When
the manufacturer and its dealer are monopolies in their own markets, there is a
situation in which each side would prefer that the other did not have the power
to set its price independently because of double-marginalization.
As in Bresnahan and Reiss (1985), this paper presents a market power ex-
planation of rent distribution between manufacturers and their exclusive deal-
ers. Unlike these authors, here the market power is not assumed but generated
through vertical product differentiation along two dimensions, the quality of the
car and the quality of the distribution services provided by the dealer, by two
6
pairs of duopolistic firms.
I show that manufacturers and their dealers can earn higher profits if each
dealer is allowed to set its additive mark-up freely. Although this result is only
valid within the confines of my assumptions, the intuition behind it can be ex-
tended easily to other settings. More generally, double-marginalization can drive
profits up if the new-car market is duopolistic instead of monopolistic provided
that the total quantity of both final goods offered in the market under total inde-
pendence is not lower than the quantity offered under horizontal collusion when
manufacturers have total control over the final price. McGuire and Staelin (1983)
first showed that it was a Nash equilibrium for a set of oligopolistic manufactur-
ers to sell through exclusive but independent dealers when the degree of price
competition among them was high, and that in this equilibrium each firm earned
a higher profit than under vertical integration. Coughlan (1985) finds a similar
result under slightly different assumption and contributes with empirical evidence
from the semiconductor industry that suggests that independent dealers help re-
duce price competition. However, they assumed the degree of price competition
while in my model it is the result of firms’ location decisions. My results show
that going from a market structure where all manufacturer and dealers are verti-
cally integrated like in Vandenbosch and Weinberg (1995) to a market structure
where the dealers are independent but exclusive does not erode the incentives for
product differentiation.
I also show that not taking advantage of all the opportunities for vertical
differentiation is the unique Sub-Game Perfect Equilibrium of this game. Firms
chose to differentiate along the dimension that promises the highest profits, i.e.
the dimension whose range is the widest as in the previous literature, and to
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locate in the same point in the other dimension. For example, if the distribution
service’s quality range is larger than the product’s quality range then the dealers
differentiate from each other while the manufacturers locate themselves at the
same point. The result is similar to the MaxMin equilibria found by dePalma et
al., (1979), Neven and Thisse (1990) and Vandenbosch and Weinberg (1995) and
it is an original contribution to the literature on vertical differentiation since the
MaxMin result has only been found in two-dimensional models where each firm
controls both dimensions and the final price.
This result can help explain why vertical differentiation among new-car deal-
ers is not large. Typically, we see significant vertical differentiation among cars
but much less vertical differentiation among dealerships: Hyundai and a Mer-
cedes Benz are much more differentiated products than the distribution services
provided by their respective dealerships. Data published by DealerRater.com
supports this claim. DealerRater.com publishes a dealer quality rating based on
spontaneous customer reviews. The rating scale is 0 to 5, being 5 the highest
mark a dealer can get from a customer1.
I regressed the dealers’ average ratings on the car brand and state dummies in
order to check if the perceived characteristics of each car brand were in any way
related to the quality associated with each dealer. I included in the dataset the
following car brands: Hyundai, Honda, Ford, Chevrolet, BMW, Mercedes Benz,
Acura, Subaru and Toyota. In Table 2.1 I show the regression results for the
brand dummies. The state dummies were included, but not shown in the table,
in order to control for the effect of different regulatory legislation that could affect
the level or quality of distribution services offered by the car dealers.
In Table 2.1, we can see that most of the dummies are not statistically signif-
8
Table 2.1: Car Brand Quality Vs. Dealer Distribution Service Quality
Variable LSE Tobit
Coef. t Coef. t
Intercept 2.37 5.30 2.46 4.72
Toyota -0.12 -0.25 -0.17 -0.31
Subaru 0.86 1.61 1.34 2.07
Mercedes 0.90 2.00 1.08 2.06
Honda -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.03
Acura 0.32 0.64 0.44 0.75
BMW 0.37 0.82 0.32 0.60
Ford -0.19 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04







icant at the usual significance levels, with the exception of Subaru and Mercedes
Benz (Hyundai is the omitted brand and California is the omitted state). Al-
though the coefficients are statistically significant and Subaru and Mercedes’ signs
partially support the hypothesis that brand quality might be positively related
to dealer quality, their value suggest that the differentiation among dealers is at
most weak and not very consistent. On the one hand, only 1.34 points on a 0
to 5 scale separate Hyundai dealers from Mercedes dealers. On the other hand,
although our hypothesis imply that Mercedes should be of higher quality than
Subaru’s, the difference in coefficients is 0.26 points in favor of Subaru. Finally,
we can see that BMW dealers are not statistically different from Hyundai dealers.
The model developed here also explains two additional facts: that in higher-
quality cars the manufacturer and retailer margins are higher and that there
appears to be a nearly proportional relation between manufacturer’s margins and
dealer’s margins across products with different quality content (see Bresnahan
and Reiss 1985 for a discussion about these stylized facts).
In order to derive my results, I use a two-stage vertical product differentiation
model to study the location equilibria of a set of manufacturers’ good quality and
retailers’ distribution services on a space defined by these two vertical character-
istics, under the assumption that each manufacturer sells through one retailer
exclusively and each firm sets its price independently.
New-car dealers typically enjoy extensive freedom in setting their mark-up
1According to their website ”Anyone who is not currently affiliated with any Dealership can
write a review provided he/she has had first hand experience with the Dealership. Example
of some one who can not write a review: Salesman A buys a car from Dealer B. Even though
Salesman A does not work for Dealer B, he can not write a review since he is an employee of a
Dealership.” The data presented here was extracted from the website on July 29, 2004.
10
and in choosing the quality level associated with the distribution service provided.
This is due, in part, to the fact that monitoring these two variables is very costly
for car manufacturers.2
Evidence from past antitrust cases shows that manufacturers have tried to
control the final price from time to time, with poor results. However, all cases
found show that, contrary to the predictions from the successive monopolies
literature, when they did it they tried to enforce minimum rather than maximum
resale prices.3
In one case, for example, a car manufacturer tried to monitor its dealers’
prices and made attempts to impose fines if the dealers sold below agreed prices
or granted higher discounts than allowed.4
2It is not the aim of the paper to discuss the explicit legislation that regulates many as-
pects of the manufacturer-dealer relationship but only the regulation originated from antitrust
cases dealing with vertical restrictions. For a discussion of the institutional restrictions on
manufacturer-dealer relations see Smith (1982)
3For example, following an investigation carried out in 1994, New Zealand’s Commerce
Commission began a court action against Toyota New Zealand Limited because Toyota assisted
its franchised dealers with discounts given by them on sales of new Toyotas to fleet owners.
The aim of the scheme was to limit discounts Toyota dealers might offer when fleet owners were
buying new vehicles, which was in contravention of the resale price maintenance provisions
of the Commerce Act. The Commission acknowledged that Toyota had ceased the practice
prior to the Commission’s investigation and had co-operated with the Commission. Toyota
agreed to having judgment entered against it, and a penalty of 250,000 dollars. Commission
Chairman Dr Alan Bollard acknowledged that ”There is no evidence in this case, that Toyota’s
guidelines worked, or that there was damage to buyers. However resale price maintenance
is anti-competitive and can lead to considerably higher costs for consumers.” New Zealand
Commerce Commission Media Release. Source: http://www.comcom.govt.nz
4In March 2003 the Canadian Competition Bureau settled a price maintenance case involv-
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The evidence shows that dealers often were able to circumvent such minimum
resale price maintenance impositions by means of offering more generous trade-
ins to buyers, or by putting some mileage on a new car and selling it for less as
a ”demo” unit5. As a result, car manufacturers usually have not put much of
a fight when the antitrust authorities challenged their practices. Thus, we can
conclude that dealers enjoy a de facto, due to informational asymmetries, and de
jure, due to antitrust law, freedom to pursue their best benefit.
Thus, we can safely assume that dealers buy the cars at cost plus insurance
plus freight (C.I.F.) and then attach a set of distribution services to them charg-
ing an additive mark-up over the purchase cost. The pricing game played by
manufacturers and dealers can be best characterized as a non-cooperative game.
I model the pricing game as a simultaneous game where the final price is made
of two “mark-ups”. The manufacturers charge a “mark-up” over the price of the
distribution services charged by the dealers, and the dealers charge a “mark-up”
over the wholesale price charged by the manufacturers (for expositional purposes
we will continue to use the label ”mark-up” for the prices charged by the retailers
ing Toyota Canada Inc. and its Access Toyota Program. The parties agreed to a Consent
Prohibition Order issued by the Federal Court of Canada requiring Toyota to amend its sales,
promotion, training and monitoring practices. As part of the settlement, Toyota made volun-
tary donations totalling 2.3 million dollars. The Bureau’s inquiry addressed allegations that
Toyota was prohibiting dealers under the Access Toyota Program from selling vehicles below
”Access/Drive-Away Prices.” Toyota fully cooperated with the Bureau’s investigation and was
willing to address its concerns regarding the challenged practice, without costly litigation.
5In the merger case between Unitrans Motors (Pty) Ltd and the motor division of Senwes
Ltd, it emerged that manufacturers dictated the margins made on their products, the number
of cars sold and even how the cars were sold but that dealers had many ways to circumvent
these impositions. Source: http://www.compcom.co.za
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and ”wholesale price” for the price charged by the manufacturers).
The analysis is based on a two stage non-cooperative game. In the first stage
each firm chooses the quality of its product/distribution service. In the second
stage, and having observed its rivals’ quality choices, each firm chooses its price.
For the sake of tractability, I restrict the analysis to the case where there are two
manufacturers and two retailers in the market and there is not entry or exit of
firms. In the next section I present the formal model in detail.
2.2 The Model
Let Sj be the quality of the good produced by manufacturer j and Dr be the
quality for the distribution service provided by retailer r. Then, the final product
is the bundle (j, r) where j = 1, 2 and r = 1, 2.(See Figure 1.1).
Consumers are heterogeneous, their valuation for the pair (Sj, Dr) is idiosyn-
cratic, and they have a unitary demand. A household i who buys good j from
retailer r derives utility Uijr, where:
Ui,j,r = A + θ
S
i Sj + θ
D
i Dr − Pj,r
The final price paid by the consumer is Pj,r, where:
P(j, r) = wj + xr
wj is the price charged by manufacturer r and xr is the price charged by dealer
r. For the chosen alternative , utility maximization requires that:
Ui,j,r = A + θ
S
i Sj + θ
D
i Dr − Pj,r ≥ Ui,−j,−r = A + θSi S−j + θDi D−r − P−j,−r
where A is high enough to allow all consumers to enjoy positive utility at the
equilibrium prices. Under this assumption, price competition only affects market
shares. This assumption makes tractable our model and allows us to concentrate



































= 1, θDi ∈ [0, 1]
The analysis presented in this section follows closely Vandenbosch and Wein-
berg (1995).








Let us define “Asymmetric characteristics competition” as competition be-
tween firms when each firm has a relative advantage on one of the two character-
istics only and “Dominated characteristics competition” as competition when one
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of the firms has a relative advantage on both characteristics. Also, let us define
“Characteristic S dominance” as the situation where (S1 − S2) ≥ (D2 −D1) or
(S2 − S1) ≥ (D2 −D1) and “Characteristic D dominance” the situation where
(S1 − S2) ≤ (D2 −D1) or (S2 − S1) ≤ (D2 −D1). Without loss of generality,
it is assumed that under “Asymmetric characteristic competition” good 1 has
the advantage on characteristic S and good 2 has the advantage on characteris-
tic D, and that under “Dominated characteristics competition” good 2 has the


















Figure 2.2: Asymmetric characteristics competition: characteristic S dominance
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From the expression for the indifference line and given good 2’s price, we can
see that for good 1 there are four boundary price levels at which its demand
function changes shape. These price levels are:
(w1 + x1)


























u = (w2 + x2) + (S1 − S2)
(w1 + x1)
m = (w2 + x2) + (S1 − S2)− (D2 −D1)
(w1 + x1)
n = (w2 + x2)
(w1 + x1)
l = (w2 + x2)− (D2 −D1)
For Retailer 2 and Manufacturer 2:
(w2 + x2)
u = (w1 + x1) + (D2 −D1)
(w2 + x2)
m = (w1 + x1)
(w2 + x2)
n = (w1 + x1)− (S1 − S2) + (D2 −D1)
(w2 + x2)
l = (w1 + x1)− (S1 − S2)
Thus, the following restrictions define each of the six relevant regions6.
Rs2 : S1−S2 ≥ D2−D1 ≥ 0, (w1 + x1) ∈ [(w1 + x1)n , (w1 + x1)m] , (w2 + x2) ∈
[(w2 + x2)
n , (w2 + x2)
m]
6There are twelve regions in total. However, only these six regions are relevant for the
analysis, as it is proved in Appendix A
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Rd2 : D2−D1 ≥ S1−S2 ≥ 0, (w1 + x1) ∈ [(w1 + x1)m , (w1 + x1)n] , (w2 + x2) ∈
[(w2 + x2)
m , (w2 + x2)
n]
dRs1 : S2−S1 ≥ D2−D1 ≥ 0, (w1 + x1) ∈
[
(w1 + x1)
l , (w1 + x1)
n
]
, (w2 + x2) ∈[
(w2 + x2)
l , (w2 + x2)
n
]
dRs2 : S2−S1 ≥ D2−D1 ≥ 0, (w1 + x1) ∈
[
(w1 + x1)
u , (w1 + x1)
l
]
, (w2 + x2) ∈[
(w2 + x2)
u , (w2 + x2)
l
]
dRd1 : D2−D1 ≥ S2−S1 ≥ 0, (w1 + x1) ∈ [(w1 + x1)u , (w1 + x1)n] , (w2 + x2) ∈
[(w2 + x2)
u , (w2 + x2)
n]
dRd2 : D2−D1 ≥ S2−S1 ≥ 0, (w1 + x1) ∈
[
(w1 + x1)
l , (w1 + x1)
u
]
, (w2 + x2) ∈[
(w2 + x2)
l , (w2 + x2)
u
]
In order to solve this game by backward induction, we must start deriving the
price equilibrium in each one of these regions. For example, consider the region




[6 (S1 − S2)− (D2 −D1)] ; w1 = 1
10




[4 (S1 − S2) + (D2 −D1)] ; w2 = 1
10
[4 (S1 − S2) + (D2 −D1)] (2.2)
These prices are an equilibrium provided they lie in the intervals defining Rs2.
(x1 + w1) ∈ [(w1 + x1)n , (w1 + x1)m] ; (x2 + w2) ∈ [(w2 + x2)n , (w2 + x2)m]
It is easy to prove that (x1 + w1) ∈ [(w1 + x1)n , (w1 + x1)m] and (x2 + w2) ∈
[(w2 + x2)
n , (w2 + x2)
m] if S1−S2 ≥ D2−D1. Since this condition is always true
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under “Asymmetric Characteristic S dominance”, there is no need to calculate
the equilibrium prices in Rs1 and Rs3.
In Appendix B I derive the price equilibria for each relevant region. Equi-
librium prices in all regions are higher than the respective equilibrium prices
in Vandenbosch and Weinberg’s paper. This is due to the existence of double-
marginalization between the manufacturer and its retailer.
After solving the second stage, we replace these prices into the respective
profit functions and derive the location equilibrium. The location equilibrium is
determined by comparing each firm’s most profitable product position, subject
to the competitor’s position, in all relevant demand regions. First, the condi-
tions determining the range of product positions allowable in each region are
considered. Then, from the FOCs of the relevant profit functions for the product
position we determine whether a firm’s profits are improved by increasing or de-
creasing the level associated with the vertical characteristic. Finally, each firm’s
maximum profit in each relevant region, subject to the competitor’s location, are
determined and compared. The product locations that yield the highest profit
represent a best response to the competitor’s location.
Proposition 2.1 Given our assumptions and if
(
S − S) ≤ (D −D), there








(Proof in Appendix C).
Proposition 2.2 Given our assumptions and if
(
S − S) > (D −D), there








(Proof in Appendix C).
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The demand function will be different in each of the six relevant regions
defined by the before mentioned cases. The first stage of the sequential game
involves the firms’ simultaneous choice of product location. These product deci-
sions are dependent on the equilibrium prices. The procedure used to determine
the product equilibrium involves, first, the determination of which demand re-
gions need to be considered for the product equilibrium analysis. Second, the
firms’ profit functions in each of the relevant regions are calculated. Third, the
FOCs of the profit functions, combined with the demand region restrictions, are
used to determine the maximum profit equilibrium locations within each of the
demand regions. Finally, the maximum profit levels in each of the relevant re-
gions are compared to determine the equilibrium location representing the firm’s
optimal product location choice, given its competitor’s choice.
In Appendix C I prove that in each case the equilibrium is unique. I show that
if Retailer 2 and Manufacturer 2 provide the maximum quality possible in each







D −D) ≥ 4
25
(







D −D) ≤ 4
25
(
S − S). For Retailer 2 and Manufacturer 2
it is always optimal to provide the maximum quality possible no matter in which
of these two locations the Retailer 1 and Manufacturer 1 choose to be.
Table 2.2 shows each firm’s profit. Under non-integration each and every firm
earns higher profits than under complete vertical integration. Since the equilib-
rium location is the same under non-exclusivity and exclusivity, the higher prof-
its are only due to the existence of double-marginalization under non-exclusivity.
Unlike McGuire and Staelin (1983) I did not show whether non-exclusivity is an
equilibrium of an extended three-stage game where in the first stage firms decide
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Table 2.2: Firms’ Profits(
D −D) ≥ (S − S) (D −D) ≤ (S − S)




D −D) ΠM1 = 425
(
S − S)




D −D) ΠR1 = 425
(
S − S)




D −D) ΠM2 = 925
(
D −D)




D −D) ΠR2 = 925
(
D −D)
whether they will be integrated or not. However, it would be interesting to study
how the decision to vertically integrate interacts with the location decision.
2.3 Implications for Market Structure and Con-
clusion
In this model I have found that under separate profit maximization firms do
not differentiate themselves to the maximum extent possible. This result is an
original contribution to the literature on vertical differentiation since the MaxMin
result has only been established for two-dimensional models where each horizontal
competitor controls both dimensions and the final price.
It is interesting to note that despite the lack of explicit coordination between
each manufacturer and its dealer, firms chose to differentiate along the dimension
that promises the highest profits, i.e. the dimension whose range is the widest as
in the previous literature.
Also, if we look at the price equilibria in the different regions we see that the
firms which are not differentiated charge the same prices than the firms which
are vertically differentiated. This is crucial in ensuring that no profitable devi-
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ations towards vertical differentiation exist for the non-differentiated horizontal
competitors. Thus, here, the differentiated firms transfer half of the profits from
differentiation to the firms that are not vertically differentiated. Then, the model
presented here is able to explain why, as pointed by Bresnahan and Reiss, ”...there
appears to be a nearly proportional relation between the manufacturer’s margin
and the dealer’s margin across the product line [9, pp.253].”
In our model, the pricing game generates a double-marginalization situation.
As a result of the double-marginalization, the equilibrium final prices under sep-
arate profit maximization are higher than under joint maximization. Double
marginalization exists even when, under our assumptions, the product market
demand is fixed because product differentiation generates a negatively sloped
(with respect to price) market share function.
In this model, higher prices translate necessarily into higher profits. Thus,
separate profit maximization is the Pareto optimal vertical structure, although we
do not know whether it is an equilibrium. This result is driven by the assumption
that the market is covered at the equilibrium prices, then double-marginalization
does not have any cost in terms of reduction in the total quantity demanded by
the market. In the real world, profits under double-marginalization will be higher
if the equilibrium prices are higher than the prices under joint maximization but
lower than the monopoly price. This is usually overlooked when studying the
effects of double-marginalization on profits.
In addition, when we incorporate this possibility into the analysis we can
understand why manufacturers have tried to enforce minimum resale prices, since
prices in an oligopolistic market can be far from the monopoly price even when
double-marginalization is present.
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Finally, both results have important policy implications for predicting vertical
structure in this market characterization. If separate profit maximization is the
Pareto optimal vertical structure but not a Nash Equilibrium of the static game,
firms might enforce it as the outcome of a repeated game.
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Chapter 3
Vertical Product Differentiation under
Non Exclusivity
3.1 Introduction
In this paper, I use a two-stage vertical product differentiation model to study the
location equilibria of a set of retailers’ distribution services quality and manufac-
turers’ good quality on a space defined by these two vertical characteristics, under
the assumption that each manufacturer sells to any retailer and each retailer buys
from any manufacturer (non-exclusivity).
This characterization fits the market structure observed between manufactur-
ers of groceries and their retailers. In particular, it is an accurate representation
if the product market definition for retailer services is one-stop shopping distribu-
tion services as opposed to top-up, urgent or impulse shopping. In this market the
retailers are supermarkets offering a sufficiently wide assortment of products and
brands (for a discussion about why one-stop shopping is a separate product mar-
ket from top-up, urgent or impulse shopping see UK Competition Commission’s
report on the retail market (2000)).
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I found that there is a Nash Equilibrium to this game in which each firm
differentiates its product completely from its horizontal competitor. The equi-
librium mimics the Subgame Perfect Equilibrium outcome in a game where each
manufacturer and each retailer offer its good to the consumers directly, and then
each consumer does the bundling (mix and match) at will.
The analysis is based on a two stage non-cooperative game. In the first stage
each firm chooses the quality of its product/distribution service. In the second
stage, and having observed its rivals’ quality choices, each firm chooses its price.
I model the pricing game as a simultaneous game among all firms. In this game
I assume that the final price is made of two “mark-ups”. The manufacturers
charge a “mark-up” over the price of the distribution services charged by the
supermarkets, and the supermarkets charge a “mark-up” over the wholesale price
charged by the manufacturers (for expositional purposes we will continue to use
the label ”mark-up” for the price charged by the retailers and ”wholesale price”
for the price charged by the manufacturers).
I solve this game by backwards induction by finding the Nash Equilibrium in
pricing strategies and then the Nash Equilibrium in product locations.
For the sake of tractability, I restrict the analysis to the case where there are
two manufacturers and two retailers in the market, there is not entry or exit of
firms and the market is totally covered at the equilibrium prices.
The last assumption implies that firm decisions about quality and price do
not affect the market demand but only each firm’s market share. Although
this simplifies the analysis a lot, simplicity comes at a cost. Suppose that for a
given quality each firm decides to increase its price so that consumers’ preferences
among the differentiated products does not change. If we assume that the market
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is covered then market shares do not change and actual quantities sold do not
change either. However, this does not have to be the case. After the price
increment, some consumers might find that it is optimal for them not to consume
at all. We discuss this possibility further in the next section.
3.2 The Model
I model the pricing game by assuming that the final price is made of two “mark-
ups”. The manufacturers charge a “mark-up” over the price of the distribution
services charged by the supermarkets, and the supermarkets charge a “mark-up”
over the wholesale price charged by the manufacturers. I look then for a Nash
Equilibrium in pricing strategies.
Let Sj be the quality of the good produced by manufacturer j and Dr be the
quality for the distribution service provided by retailer r. Then, the final product
is the bundle (j, r) where j = 1, 2 and r = 1, 2.
Consumers are heterogeneous, their valuation for the pair (Sj, Dr) is idiosyn-
cratic, and they have a unitary demand. A household i who buys good j from
retailer r derives utility Ui,j,r, where:
Ui,j,r = A + θ
S
i Sj + θ
D
i Dr − Pj,r
For the chosen alternative, utility maximization requires that:
Ui,j,r = A + θ
S
i Sj + θ
D
i Dr − Pj,r ≥ Ui,−j,−r = A + θSi S−j + θDi D−r − P−j,−r
where A is high enough to allow all consumers to enjoy positive utility at the
equilibrium prices. Under this assumption, price competition only affects market
shares. This assumption makes tractable our model and allow us to concentrate
on the strategic effects of price competition among firms with respect to quality
choice.
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= 1, θDi ∈ [0, 1]
I prove that this game has a SPE in which each manufacturer differentiates its
good and each retailer differentiates its distribution service, from its respective
horizontal competitors, as much as possible. I cannot prove that this is the unique
SPE, except in the case where I restrict each manufacturer to charge the same
wholesale price to each retailer, and each retailer to charge the same mark-up
over each manufacturer’s good.
My strategy is to find the SPE for the restricted game (Proposition 3.1) and
then prove that this SPE is a SPE of the game where manufacturers can charge
different wholesale prices to each retailer and retailers can charge a different
mark-up on each manufacturer’s good (Proposition 3.2).
Proposition 3.1 If each manufacturer is restricted to charge the same whole-
sale price to each retailer and each retailer to charge the same mark-up over each
manufacturer’s good, the unique SPE in pure strategies involves quality differ-
entiation to the maximum extent possible in both, the goods and the distribution
services.
Sketch of a Proof (Proof in Appendix C.):
Let
Pjr = wj + xr j = 1, 2; r = 1, 2
Where wj is the wholesale price charged by manufacturer j and xr is the
mark-up charged by retailer r. A consumer i who buys good 1 from retailer 1
must satisfy:
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θSi S1 + θ
D
i D1 − P11 ≥ θSi S1 + θDi D2 − P12 (3.1)
θSi S1 + θ
D
i D1 − P11 ≥ θSi S2 + θDi D1 − P21 (3.2)
θSi S1 + θ
D
i D1 − P11 ≥ θSi S2 + θDi D2 − P22 (3.3)









(w2 + x2)− (w1 + x1)− θSi (S2 − S1)
D2 −D1
It is easy to show that when the two first inequalities hold, the third holds
too. This is a result driven by the assumption stating that each retailer charges
a uniform mark-up on each good. Then, we are allowed to derive the aggregate










The rest of the aggregate demand functions are derived in the same way. Since
the demand that retailer 1 faces is made up by (AD11 + AD21) and he charges








From (AD11 + AD21) it is clear that modeling the pricing game as a sequential
game would produce the same profit function since wholesale prices do not enter
in the profit function of the retailer (and mark-ups do not enter the profit function
of the manufacturers). Moreover, retailer 1 will not care about what product is
sold because they charge the same mark-up on both products. Also, manufacturer
1 will not care about the size of the mark-up charged by each retailer because the
retailer charges the same mark-up on manufacturer 2 and the assumption that
says that the market is always covered implies that what does not affect market
shares does not affect demand for each firm.
Although this simplifies the analysis a lot, simplicity comes at a cost. Suppose
that for a given quality each firm decides to increase its price so that consumers’
preferences among the differentiated products does not change. If we assume that
the market is covered then market shares do not change and actual quantities
sold do not change either. However, this does not have to be the case. After
the price increment, some consumers might find that it is optimal for them not
to consume at all. Then, even when each retailer charges a uniform mark-up on
both manufacturers’ products and each manufacturer the same wholesale price
to both retailers, we will find that the wholesale price charged by manufacturer
1 and 2 will enter the profit function of retailer 1 and that the mark-up charged
by retailer 1 and 2 will enter the profit function of manufacturer 1.
However, from Propositon 3.1 we are allowed to conclude that this is the only
channel through which price decisions in the ”upstream” market will affect the
”downstream” market, and the reverse, because when we assume that the market
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is always covered what firms in the ”downstream” market decide only affects that
market.
In the second stage, each retailer and manufacturer reaction function is de-
rived from its FOC. Then, we solve for the NE in prices given a quality level
vector. We update each firm’s profit function with the NE prices and let each
manufacturer and retailer maximize its profit with respect to quality. The SPE
outcome is quality differentiation to the maximum extent possible.
Proposition 2 The SPE in pure strategies outcome from the restricted game
is a NE equilibrium of a modified game (the unrestricted game) where each man-
ufacturer can charge each retailer a different wholesale price, and each retailer
can charge a different mark-up on each manufacturer’s good.
Sketch of a Proof (Proof in Appendix 3.2.):
Let us assume, without loss of generality, that manufacturer 2 and retailer 2
are the high quality firms: D2 > D1, S2 > S1 and that P22−P21 > P12−P11 > 0
where P12 is the price charged on the good from manufacturer 1 and retailer 2.
Then, demand functions are:
AD11 =
(
(x12 + w12)− (x11 + w11)
D2 −D1
)(




− (x22 + w22 + x11 + w11 − x12 − w12 − x21 − w21)
2
2 (D2 −D1) (S2 − S1)
AD21 =
(
(x22 + w22)− (x21 + w21)
D2 −D1
)(






1− (x12 + w12)− (x11 + w11)
D2 −D1
)(







1− (x22 + w22)− (x21 + w21)
D2 −D1
)(





− (x22 + w22 + x11 + w11 − x12 − w12 − x21 − w21)
2
2 (D2 −D1) (S2 − S1)
Let us replace this demand functions into the profit functions of retailers
and manufacturers, and use the same equilibrium concept to solve this problem.
Since, for each firm, the demand function is quadratic in its own price, profit
functions are cubic in that price, and then FOCs are quadratic.
I prove that, at stage 2, each supplier does not have an incentive to deviate
from charging the same wholesale price to both retailer and that each retailer
does not have an incentive to deviate from charging the same mark-up on the
goods from both manufacturers. For example, for retailer 1 it is a best response
to charge x11 = x12 =
1
3
(D2 −D1), given that retailer 2, manufacturer 1 and
manufacturer 2 charges x12 = x22 =
2
3




(S2 − S1) respectively. Because the pricing game played is symmetric for
manufacturers and retailers we only need to derive the best responses for the
manufacturers or the retailers. Profit functions for retailer 1 (retailer 2), given
what retailer 2 (retailer 1), manufacturer 1 and manufacturer 2 charge, are:
ΠR1 =
9 (x11 − x21)2 (x11 + 2x21) + 6 (S1 − S2) (x211 + 2x221)




3 (x11 − x21)2 + (S1 − S2) (x11 + 2x21)
)
18 (D1 −D2) (S1 − S2)
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ΠR2 =
9 (x12 − x22)2 (2x12 + x22) + 6 (S1 − S2) (x212 + 2x222)




3 (x12 − x22)2 + (S1 − S2) (x12 + 2x22)
)
18 (D1 −D2) (S1 − S2)
Now, let us solve for the best response function from the respective FOCs. I
get three critical point vectors for each retailer. For retailer 1, the critical point
vectors are:












−3 (D2 −D1)− 4 (S2 − S1)
)
(3.13)
x21 = − 2
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−3 (D2 −D1)− 4 (S2 − S1)
)
(3.14)
x21 = − 2
27
(




−3 (D2 −D1)− 4 (S2 − S1)
)
For retailer 2, the critical point vectors are:





x11 = − 1
54
(




24 (D1 −D2) + 25 (S1 − S2)
)
(3.16)
x21 = − 1
54
(




24 (D1 −D2) + 25 (S1 − S2)
)
x11 = − 1
54
(




24 (D1 −D2) + 25 (S1 − S2)
)
(3.17)
x21 = − 1
54
(




24 (D1 −D2) + 25 (S1 − S2)
)
The second order conditions for a local maximum only hold for (3.12) and
(3.15). Then, for each retailer, charging a uniform additive mark-up on both
manufacturers’ goods is Sub-Game Perfect Equilibrium. By symmetry, the same
happens to the manufacturers. Then, we can rely on Proposition 3.1 to derive
the location equilibrium.
Table 3.1: Firms’ Profits




















If we compare the consolidated profits of all firms in Table 2.2 with the those in
Table 3.1 we can see that whenever the range for product quality differentiation,
(S − S), is not very different from the range for distribution service quality
differentiation , (D−D), then the consolidated profits of all firms are higher under
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non-exclusivity. Instead, if (S−S) > 125
109
(D−D) or if (S−S) < 109
125
(D−D) then
the consolidated profits of all firms are higher under exclusivity. Since under
exclusivity firms differentiate along the dimension whose range is larger, then
they forgo less profits from differentiation whenever the ratio of the two vertical
dimensions is closer to zero or infinity.
Thus, the trade-off is clear in these two models: having two sources of oligopolis-
tic rent but no double-marginalization on each source versus double-marginalizing
over the largest source of oligopolistic rent.
Moreover, manufacturer 1 and retailer 1 are always better off under exclusiv-
ity. This suggests that for them, double-marginalization under exclusivity more
than compensates for the lower vertical differentiation. On the other hand, man-
ufacturer 2 and retailer 2 are almost always better off under non-exclusivity.
Note that under non-exclusivity, the high quality firms get four times the
profits of the low quality firms while under exclusivity, the high quality firms
get approximately twice the profits of the low quality firms. These comparisons
do not allow us to make any general statement about what would happen with
profits under these two market structures in a more realistic setting. However,
they highlight how double marginalization and vertical differentiation can interact
with each other.
3.3 Implications for Market Structure and Con-
clusion
I have proved that if each manufacturer sells to any retailer and each retailer
sells from any manufacturer and the market is totally covered, both types of
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firms retain the incentives to fully differentiate their products as if they were
selling them unbundled to the consumers.
This result is driven by the fact that when retailers carry both manufacturers’
products, it is a Nash equilibrium for the retailers to charge the same additive
mark-up on the manufacturers’ product and for the manufacturers to charge the
same wholesale price to each retailer. When this occurs, then wholesale prices
do not enter in the profit function of the retailer and mark-ups do not enter the
profit function of the manufacturers.
This result is important for its simplicity and implications. It says that,
under our assumptions, whenever we analyze the strategic location of a set of
vertically related firms offering a final product to the consumers we can abstract
from considering the vertical relationship among the firms without affecting the
results of our analysis.
It also says that whenever the location of the firms in the ”upstream” market
affect the profits and location of firms in the downstream market total demand,
not only market shares, must be affected.
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Chapter 4
Gone In Thirteen Seconds: Advertising
and Search in the Supermarket
4.1 Introduction
In this paper, I estimate the effects associated with advertising a brand and
its price on consumers’ brand choice and search behavior inside the refrigerated
orange juice category.
Optimal search models (Stigler 1961, Rothschild 1974, Weitzman 1979) sug-
gest that consumers might restrict the number of brands they search (the con-
sumer’s choice set) if this is a costly activity, and that advertising can affect the
search effort by providing economically relevant information in a convenient way
0Dickson and Sawyer [16] find that consumers spend an average of 13 seconds in selecting
a brand out of the shelf. This is a very short time for a consumer to incorporate all the
often-available marketing information associated with a given product category offered by a
typical supermarket. Then, retailers and manufacturers’ efforts to make available as much
information as possible in a convenient way could lead consumers to make better decisions.
Among the marketing tools that manufacturers and retailers often use we will analyze the
effect of featuring a brand in newspapers and/or store leaflets.
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(Betancourt and Gautschi 1988).
The evidence from the empirical literature suggests that advertising affects the
economic returns from search and then the size of the choice set finally considered
(Modjuska et al. 2001, Ackerberg 2001, Murthi and Srinivasan 1999, Allenby and
Ginter 1995). For example, Ackerberg (2001) and Murthi and Srinivasan (1999)
find that advertising increases the size of the consumer’s choice set. On the
other hand, Allenby and Ginter (1995) find that advertising’s main effect is to
persuade the exposed consumers to reduce search outside the choice set made of
the advertised brands.
Also, the economic literature recognizes that advertising can increase the
probability of choosing the featured product or brand by “persuading” (Gal-
braith 1976) consumers to buy a particular brand, by generating utility in the
same way goods do it (Stigler and Becker 1977), and by affecting positively the
utility associated with the advertised good or brand (Becker and Murphy (1993)
show the implications of treating advertisements and the advertised goods as
complements).
I focus my attention on a particular type of advertising, i.e. brand and price
ads that are featured in mail leaflets and local newspapers.
My results suggest that consumers make their choices after searching only a
restricted set of alternatives even when the number of alternatives is not large
and that advertising featuring increases the probability of purchase associated
with the featured brand and the probability that consumers search larger choice
sets.
I identify the effect of featuring on brand utility and search by proper parametriza-
tion of the probability of purchase associated with each brand and the probability
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associated with each possible choice set. I used the GenL model, due to Swait
(2001), in which choice probabilities associated to each brand and to each pos-
sible (latent) choice set are estimated from the sampled purchases. The model
belongs to the Generalized Extreme Value family of discrete choice models and
is a generalization of the Nested Multinomial Logit (NML) model. I implement
a variation of this model where consumers are allowed to pick their choice sets
using less information than available.
A discrete choice model seems appropriate for the product category I have
information about since households typically buy only one brand in each purchase
occasion. In the sample, households bought only one brand in 96% of the purchase
occasions.
4.2 Effects of Advertising
Advertising can have different effects on consumer behavior. In the following
paragraphs, I summarize its potential effects according to the literature.
Let us assume that goods have search and/or experience characteristics. Search
characteristics are characteristics that are learned through inspection while ex-
perience characteristics are learned through consumption. Under different as-
sumptions, advertising can be a good substitute for direct inspection (Stigler
1961, Grossman and Shapiro 1984) and consumption (Nelson 1974, Kihlstrom
and Riordan 1984, and Milgrom and Roberts 1986). Advertising can also gen-
erate utility by itself or by giving favorable notice to other goods (Stigler and
Becker 1977, Becker and Murphy 1993).
If advertising increases utility then, ceteris paribus, we should see an increase
in the probability of purchase associated with the featured brand. Optimal search
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models predict that if this effect is strong, consumers might choose to abort their
search for additional alternatives. Finally, if featuring reduces search costs then
it can generate an increase in the size of the choice set searched by the consumer.
The effect of featuring activity on search is due to the fact that the cost of
search is an increasing function of the number of brands searched, for the chief
cost is time. If being exposed to a feature reduces the time spent on searching the
featured brand, then consumers’ might be willing to increase the size of the choice
set finally considered. The simplest example arises when consumers are subject
to a time constraint that limits the number of brands that they can search. In the
next paragraphs I provide a more elaborate example where featuring can have a
positive effect on the size of the choice set finally considered even when there are
no time or budget constraints involved.
Weitzman (1979) derived the optimal search strategy for a consumer facing
n alternatives, who is uncertain about each alternative’s potential reward. Let
us assume that it costs ci to learn the characteristics of item i. The learning is
instantaneous once the consumer paid the cost. In the next paragraphs I use
Weitzman’s solution to show how featuring can increase the size of the choice set
finally considered by a consumer.
Let us assume that there are a number of different brands of a good. Brand
i gives a consumer potential utility ui with probability distribution Fi (xi), inde-
pendent of the other utilities. It costs ci to learn all the characteristics of brand
i. Every time the consumer decides to sample another brand, he must select the
next one and spend the necessary time learning its characteristics. The consumer
maximizes the expected utility’s present value. Weitzman (1979) proves that the
optimal strategy is a sequential decision rule that will tell the consumer at each
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stage whether or not to continue searching, and if so, which brand to search next.
Let us assume that the disutility or opportunity cost of searching brand i is
increasing in the amount of time already spent in the search process. With some










tj ≥ fj (4.1)
where tj is the time the consumer must spend in searching brand j and fj is
the time saving brought by the brand j being featured. Brands j are the ones
already searched before brand i.
In each stage, the consumer must choose if he searches another brand. In our
example, suppose our consumer has searched one brand already which gave him
utility equal to zi. If he chooses to search an additional brand, he can expect a
net utility equal to ui:











The consumer will be indifferent between stopping or keeping the search if zi












(xi − zi) dFi (xi)− (1− βi) zi (4.3)
The value of zi that satisfies the expression above is the reservation price of
brand i. Weitzman (1979) proved that the optimal rule entails two parts:
Selection Rule: If a brand is to be searched, it should be the brand with the
highest reservation utility.
Stopping Rule: Terminate search whenever the maximum sampled utility
exceeds the reservation utility of every non-searched brand.
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Given our assumptions, it is very easy to find examples where the choice set
finally searched by the consumer increases in size if featuring reduces the time
spent in searching enough. Suppose that our consumer is considering if he is
going to search a third brand. Let us assume that when there is no feature the
cost associated to searching the third brand is higher than its expected utility, in-



















(x3 − y2) dF3 (x3)− (1− β3) z3 (4.5)
where y2 is the utility reached if the consumer picks the highest value between
the first two searched alternatives. Then if brand one is featured the consumer
will prefer to search a third brand. More generally, if the opportunity cost or
disutility of time of search associated to any brand increases with the number of
brands already searched, the feature of any brand can have a positive effect on
the size of the choice set finally considered.
Finally, if advertising is a perfect substitute for direct inspection or consump-
tion then utility maximization implies that it will not affect the choice among
brands in the sense that consumers that learned the information from the ad and
consumers that learned it from other sources should show, ceteris paribus, the
same choices . If learning through an ad is cheaper than searching, the advertised
brand becomes more rewarding (see equation (2)), and so consumers might want
to include that brand in their choice sets. This will have a positive effect on the
probability of purchase of the advertised brand.
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Betancourt (2004) discusses the potentially positive prestige effect of adver-
tising one product on non-advertised products. This can happen when consumers
identify some characteristics as common among different products, then advertis-
ing of one product can spillover to competing products. The specification I use
does not account for this possibility.
4.3 Effects of Other Covariates on Search and
Evaluation Activity
I try to capture the effect of households’ opportunity cost of time on their search
effort by including as explanatory variables the consumer’s income and the avail-
ability of a female head of household at home. Consumers with higher income
should be less likely to engage in time-consuming search activities. Also, the set
of households where the female head of household is employed full-time should
be more time constrained than its complement. Finally, in some of the specifi-
cations tried we also controlled for the day of the week when the purchase was
made (weekday vs. weekend).
4.4 Related Literature
When estimating discrete brand choice models, it is usually assumed that each
consumer evaluates all the relevant information, such as price and other marketing
variables, on every purchase occasion. The seminal work in this area is due
to Guadagni and Little (1983). They estimate a multinomial logit model and
include among the explanatory variables whether each brand was featured or
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not, in a particular purchase occasion. They found that whenever each brand
is featured, its associated representative utility was increased. The literature on
this area is enormous and it is not my aim to do a review in this section but
to include the closest references. Three works, by Allenby and Ginter (1995),
Murthi and Srinivasan (1999) and Ackerberg (2001), are closely related to my
research questions. Also, Andrews and Srinivasan (1995), Siddarth et al., (1995)
and Bronnenberg and Vanhonacker (1996) develop approaches to determine and
analyze choice set formation where consumers first identify a subset of brands
within the universal set of brands and then evaluate those brands and pick their
most preferred one.
Murthi and Srinivasan (1999) uses a two stage multinomial choice model where
in the first stage households decide if they are going to be in “extended evalua-
tion” state or in “habitual evaluation” state. “Habitual evaluation” means that,
in the second stage, the household makes his choice relying only on intrinsic
brand preferences and loyalty. “Extended evaluation” means that the household
incorporates information on price, feature and other marketing variables in ad-
dition to intrinsic brand preferences and brand loyalty when making a choice.
The authors obtain estimates for the probability that, in a particular purchase
occasion, a consumer will be in habitual or extended evaluation state and how
that probability changes when marketing variables change. Among the explana-
tory variables they include whether there was featuring activity or not in that
particular purchase occasion. The authors find that, on average, consumers are in
an extended evaluation mode only on 59%-65% of the purchase occasions. They
also find that feature activity increases the probability of being in “extended
evaluation” mode.
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The specification I use represents an improvement over Murthi and Srini-
vasan’s specification since I estimate the probability associated to each possible
choice set, not only the largest and the smallest. Also, unlike them, my key
explanatory variable is the number of brands featured in a particular purchase
occasion. Since the data set includes purchase occasions when more than one
brand was featured, I can estimate the effect of multiple featuring on the proba-
bility that a given choice set is chosen.
Allenby and Ginter (1995) examine the influence of marketing variables, es-
pecially featuring, on household choice sets using a scanner data set of tuna
purchases. They implement a single-stage heteroskedastic random utility model
in which the random part of the utility is allowed to have alternative specific
variances. Alternatives for which consumers are more responsive to changes in
the deterministic part of the utility will have a smaller variance than the other
alternatives. Hence, a large value in alternative i’s variance will reduce the rel-
ative effect of any alternative’s price on the choice probability of alternative i.
In the different formulations of the model, they allow display and feature to in-
fluence the deterministic component of utility and/or the alternatives’ variances.
These specifications allow them to investigate whether display and feature vari-
ables affect an alternative’s deterministic utility or its price sensitivity. They find
that feature and display have a positive influence on the utility associated to the
alternative that is being displayed and/or featured, and have a negative effect on
the alternative’s price sensitivity by increasing the alternative’s variance. As a
result, displays and features serve to increase the utility of the alternative and
to reduce the influence of price in the purchase decision. The authors define a
household’s choice set by the pair wise probabilities that the household simulta-
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neously considers two brands. They find that when display and feature variables
are included in the probability calculations, it is more likely that choice sets will
include alternatives with the same brand but different characteristics (e.g., in
oil and in water). In the absence of display and feature variables the opposite
occurs. The authors suggest that the effect of featuring on reducing the price sen-
sitiveness of the featured alternative indicate that many households may identify
their preferred brand before actually going to the store and observing the array
of prices.
Finally, Ackerberg (2001) estimates the effect of the information conveyed by
the ads and the prestige effect. In order to disentangle the effects, he uses the
following identification assumption: that advertisements that inform consumers
should primarily affect consumers who have never tried the advertised brand,
whereas advertisements that create prestige effects should affect both, inexperi-
enced and experienced, users in the same way. He finds that the advertising of a
newly introduced brand of yogurt primarily affected the inexperienced consumers.
Ackerberg (2001) estimates a binomial discrete choice model where the dis-
crete decision is whether or not to purchase the new brand, and the key explana-
tory variables are the interaction between a dummy that takes a value of 1 for
each inexperienced consumer and the advertising exposure of that consumer, and
the interaction between a dummy that takes value 1 for experienced consumers
and the advertising exposure of that consumer. The advertising exposure of the
consumer is proxied by the “. . . unweighted average of a household’s past ad-
vertising intensities (i.e., the total Yoplait 150 [the new brand] advertisements
seen up to t/ the total hours of television watched up to t).” He finds a pos-
itive and statistically significant effect for the first interaction variable on the
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probability of purchasing the new brand and a positive, but lower, statistically
insignificant coefficient for the second interaction variable. Then, using his iden-
tification assumption, he concludes that an estimate for the informational effect
on the population must be the difference between these two coefficients.
The approach used here to identify the effect of advertising on consumer be-
havior has been advocated by an increasing number of authors. Among them,
Andrews and Srinivasan (1995), Siddarth et al., (1995) and Bronnenberg and
Vanhonacker (1996) are previous examples of approaches to determine and ana-
lyze choice set formation based on a two-stage decision process. In Andrews and
Srinivasan (1995) and Bronnenberg and Vanhonacker (1996) papers, in the first
stage each brand is assigned a probability that represents the likelihood that the
brand’s utility exceeds some threshold level required for consideration. In the
second stage, the consumer makes a probabilistic choice by selecting the consid-
ered brand with the highest overall utility. The main difference between these
two models and Swait’s is that the formers use exogenous covariates to explain
choice set formation while the latter allows for the possibility these are simple
functions of the underlying brand utilities rather than independent constructs.
We will see in the next section how in the GenL model the probability that some
set is the true choice set is a function of the expected maximum utility derived
from the alternatives in the set.
4.5 The Model
Let us assume that consumers make decisions in two stages: in the first stage,
alternatives are screened and evaluated using a subset of the information avail-
able and a restricted choice set is chosen, while in the second stage the selected
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alternatives are evaluated using all available information.
I also assume that consumers know all the invariant characteristics associated
with each alternative. Typically, each consumer will know if Tropicana’s quality
is higher than Minute Maid’s but they may not know if in the current week
Tropicana’s price is higher, equal or lower than Minute Maid’s.
The decision process can be characterized in the following way. In a given
week, each orange juice brand is featured with positive probability. Each con-
sumer is exposed to each brand’s weekly feature with positive probability. If
the consumer was exposed to a brand’s feature we assume that he learns all
the information contained in the feature at a negligible cost (compared to the
cost associated to learning that information by going to the supermarket and
retrieving it from the corresponding shelf). After learning the information, each
consumer leaves to the supermarket. Once in the supermarket, each consumer
starts searching the brands. Finally, he chooses the best alternative.
Thus, each consumer specify the number of brands to include in his choice
set in advance of searching, very much like in Stigler’s (1961) model. By far,
the most interesting challenge is identifying the probability associated with an
endogenously determined choice set. Given the available information, it is im-
possible to observe the set of alternatives actually searched by a consumer before
making a choice. Therefore, choice sets are latent, as their probability of occur-
rence cannot be estimated from direct observational data. We follow the previ-
ous literature on discrete choice models with latent choice sets and use the GenL
(Swait 2001) specification, which treat choice set generation as a probabilistic
process.
From an heuristic perspective, we can characterize the identification of the ef-
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fect of advertising on choice set probabilities through an example. Let us suppose
that Tropicana is on sale and that due to the decrease in its price it becomes the
most appealing brand for most of the consumers. If Tropicana is not advertised,
then consumers with idiosyncratic high search costs may not include it in their
choice set and then its probability of purchase would not increase because they
will never know about the reduced price. On the other hand, if Tropicana is
advertised, and advertising lower search costs, it will have more chances to be
included in these consumers’ choice sets. Thus, its probability of purchase would
increase. The different probabilistic behavior of our dependent variable when
conditioned on different values of the explanatory variables and parameters plus
a sample showing enough variation is what will allow me to estimate the effect
of advertising on consumer search behavior.
Let us denote the set of all possible subsets of M , the master set of alternatives,
as ∆ (M) and the number of possible subsets as K. Also, I denote choice set k
as Ck, k = 1, ..., K. Finally, each alternative belonging to M is indexed by
i = 1, .., M .
Thus, the probability associated with brand i is the summation of the prob-
abilities that brand i is chosen from choice set k, weighted by the probability
that choice set k is chosen. If we interpret choice set generation probabilities as
household population shares, then we will be able to infer which portions of the
consumers evaluate only one, two or the complete set of available brands.
Consumer n derives utility from alternative i equal to:
Uni = Vi + εni
Where, Vi is the known deterministic part and εni is the unknown and ran-
dom part of utility. The error distribution is equivalent to the convolution of K
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independent generalized extreme value variable vectors εk each with dimension
|Ck|×1. In each of these conditional distributions, component errors are IID Type
I extreme value with scale parameter µk (Swait 2001). Thus, the probability that




P (i, Ck) =
∑
k∈Ki
P (i|Ck) Q (Ck) (4.6)
where Ki , is the number of choice sets that contain alternative i.
















Identification of choice set probabilities is achieved by proper parametrization
of Q (Ck). In the GenL model, the probability that some set Ck is chosen is a
function of the expected maximum utility derived from the alternatives in the
set. This value is a function of the utilities associated to the alternatives in the
set and the degree of similarity of these alternatives, which is a function of µk,
among other things. Ik is the expected utility that the consumer obtains from the
choice situation when Ck is the choice set under consideration, sometimes referred
to as the inclusive value of choice set k. Then, as alternative j becomes more
attractive, all sets including j will have increased probability of being the true
choice set. V1,j is the known deterministic utility associated to alternative j in
the first stage (where consumers screen out alternatives from their choice sets),
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while V2,j is the known deterministic utility associated to alternative j in the
second stage (where consumers pick their most preferred alternative from their
choice set). Sk is a set of choice set specific covariates, which enter directly into
the probabilities Q (Ck). I assume that V1,j, V2,j and Sk are linear functions of
the marketing variables, other environmental variables, demographic information
and choice set characteristics.
Since, in the first stage, consumers may find it too costly to search all the
characteristics of each alternative we can let V1j be a function of only a subset
of the covariates that appear in V2j. If a covariate does not appear in V1jthat
means the characteristic represented by this covariate is not being searched and
not taken into account when the screening process is carried out. Since consumers
can form expectations about non-searched covariates like the price, and as long
as these expectations are constant throughout the sample period, we can allow
the model to capture them by including alternative specific intercepts for all the
alternatives.
As in the nested multinomial model, the vector µ = (µ1, ..., µk) characterizes
the distribution of the random part of the utility εn = (εn1, ..., εnJ). As Swait
(2001) proves, it must be true that µk > 1 for the GenL specification to be
consistent with utility maximization.
In Table 4.1 I present a sketch of the three specifications tried for this paper.
In Model 1 I let brand intercepts to be the only brand-related covariates
that explain choice set choice in the first stage. Brand intercepts will capture
all the invariant attributes associated to the brands, which are the attributes
all consumers are most probably going to be aware of. Therefore, we implicitly
assume that consumers do not take into account current marketing information
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Table 4.1: Model Specifications
Model1 Model2 Model3
V1j Brand intercepts. Brand intercepts and Brand intercepts;
marketing variables. marketing variables if
the brand is featured.
V2j Brand intercepts and Brand intercepts and Brand intercepts and
marketing variables. marketing variables. marketing variables.
Sk Featuring activity and Featuring activity and Featuring activity and
other variables. other variables. and other variables.
when they first screen some of the brands out of their choice sets. In the second
stage, consumers search all the brands that survive the screening.
Of the models presented here, this is the closest to Model E in Murthi and
Srinivasan (Table 3 pp. 247). The results obtained are also the closest to Model
E, in particular I get the same sign for the effect of feature activity, whether there
is a female head of household employed full-time, and income, on the probability
that a consumer chooses from larger choice set. In both models all estimates are
statistically significant.
Model 2 is the GenL model applied to the fresh orange juice category. In esti-
mating this model I am implicitly assuming that current marketing information
is considered when determining the composition of choice sets, since all market-
ing variables are present in each of the two stages. This model will capture the
behavior of consumers who could be inclined to search only a restricted subset of
the available brands because, for any reason that is not related to search costs,
he is captive to that subset. A hypothetical example: suppose that for some
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medical reason a subset of the consumers cannot tolerate orange juice from con-
centrate. Then, no matter what value the marketing variables take, this subset
of consumers will not search from-concentrate orange juice brands. In our case,
this subset of consumers will not react to changes in utility associated to Minute
Maid and will not search choice sets that contain this brand.
Finally, I begin the analysis of Model 3 with the first stage. I assume that
consumers are ignorant about the price associated to each brand unless the brand
is featured. If a particular brand is featured then a consumer will see the feature
with positive probability. After being exposed to that information, the consumer
must decide if he is going to keep it in his memory, and if it is worthwhile
stopping his search for information about the other brands or not. For example,
if a consumer decides, after learning the featured information on the first brand
that it is not worthwhile to continue searching then his choice set will have only
one element.
In this specification the consumer is characterized as someone who is exposed
to the feature with positive probability. Conditional on the consumer being
exposed, featuring introduces the featured brand in his choice set.
It is possible that the consumer is exposed to the feature, and that conditional
on this he does search the featured brands but also he searches non featured
brands. Since being exposed to a feature translates into a reduction in the time
spent in searching the featured product, a feature will reduce the consumers’
search costs and can have a positive effect on the size of the choice set finally
considered. This effect will make more likely that a consumer searches a choice set
larger than the number of brands featured. Again, the simplest example would
be when consumers are subject to a time constraint that limits the number of
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brands that they wish to search.
Finally, it is possible that the consumer is not exposed to the feature and that
conditional on this he does not search the featured brands. This specification
captures this event by estimating the probability associated to each choice set
finally searched. Then, this specification allows for the possibility that the choice
set made of all featured brands is searched with a probability lower than one.
The characterization described in the previous paragraphs is reflected in the
specification of V1j. As an example, let us assume that only Tropicana was fea-
tured in a given week and that the feature included price information. Then,
consumers only know the price for Tropicana and must form expectations about
the other brands price. This expectation can be captured by a brand specific
dummy variable that takes value 1 when that brand is being evaluated and it
was not featured, as long as that expectation is invariant across purchase occa-
sions. This dummy variable not only captures the price expected value but other
invariant attributes associated with the brand, like its quality or the fact that
that brand was not featured.
V1,F lorida = β1
V1,MMaid = β2
V1,PLabel = β3
V1,T ropic = β11PriceTropic + β8PriceTropicIncome + β9PriceTropicSize +
+ β10PriceTropicFful + β12FeatTropic
Sk = β13Set (3, 4) Activity + β14Set (3, 4) Size + β15Set (3, 4) Fful +
+ β16Set (3, 4) Income
Where, PriceTropic is Tropicana’s price, Income is the buyer’s income, Size
is the size of the buyer’s family, Fful is a dummy that takes value 1 if the female
52
head of household is working full time, and FeatTropic is a dummy that takes a
value 1 if Tropicana was featured on that particular purchase occasion. Finally,
Set(3, 4) is a dummy that takes the value 1 when the choice set has more than
two brands in it and Activity is the number of brands that were advertised in
that particular purchase occasion.
In the second stage I assume that consumers know all the available information
associated to the brands included in the restricted choice set. I expect Model 3
to capture the “prestige” effect, through the coefficient β12 and the informational
effect, through the coefficient β13. Regarding the informational effect, β13 should
be positive if learning the information through featuring implies a saving in time
compared with learning it from direct inspection.
4.6 Data
I use a household-level panel data on beverages purchases to answer my research
questions. The panel dataset was collected by Information Resources, Inc (IRI)
and was made available by the Economic Research Service at the US Department
of Agriculture (ERS-USDA). The data set spans over three years, 1997, 1998
and 1999. Each purchase made by each member of a cross-section of previously
drafted households was recorded at the check. In order to estimate our model we
had access to a sample containing 45975 purchase observations of 64 oz cartons of
orange juice made by 1942 households at the retail chain Stop’n’Shop in the city
of Pittsfield, Massachusetts . The brands analyzed are Minute Maid, Tropicana,
Florida’s Natural and the supermarket private label. I observe which brand was
purchased in a given day, the price paid as well as the price of the other three
brands, which brands were featured in a store circular or advertisement on a
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Table 4.2: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev.
Florida’s Natural market share 0.16
Minute Maid market share 0.11
Private Label market share 0.37
Tropicana market share 0.37
Price Florida’s Natural dollar 2.61 0.27
Price Minute Maid dollar 2.55 0.17
Price Private Label dollar 1.77 0.20
Price Tropicana dollar 2.85 0.23
Feature Florida’s Natural dummy 0.19
Feature Minute Maid dummy 0.15
Feature Private Label dummy 0.32
Feature Tropicana dummy 0.36
particular week, and which brands had issued coupons on a particular week as
well as who used those coupons. I also know if the purchase was made or not
on a weekend, how much the consumer spent on each trip to the store and the
income of the consumer, among other demographic variables.
The use of a discrete model of brand choice is supported by the fact that
households typically buy only one brand in each purchase occasion. In the sample,
households bought only one brand 96% of the purchase occasions.
Table 4.2 shows the descriptive statistics associated with a subset of the vari-
ables considered.
Our four brands accounted for more than 95% of the category brand choices.
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Of the four brands analyzed, Tropicana and Minute Maid are well-established
household brands while Florida’s Natural has a more recent history though it has
become a very strong player in the market of Not From Concentrate (NFC) orange
juice behind Tropicana. Minute Maid is the only one made from concentrated
(FC) juice. All three national brands use Florida oranges as opposed to other
national brands like Sunkist, which use California oranges.
In Figure 4.1 we can see the behavior of each brand’s weekly price.
Figure 4.1: Weekly Prices
Using a discrete-choice framework simplifies the analysis although as a result
there is no way to account for household inventory behavior, which means that
we cannot perfectly assimilate brand preference share among households with
market share. In the Table 4.3 I show the frequency of multiunit buys.
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Table 4.3: Multiunit Buys Frequency
Variable Frequency Relative Frequency
1 unit 30631 66.6%
2 units 12991 28.2%
3 units 1036 2.3%
4 units 934 2.0%
5 units or more 506 0.9%
Two-thirds of the purchases, consumers bought only one unit. Also, 66.2% of
the households bought one and two units on at least once occasion. Although we
cannot perfectly assimilate brand preference share behavior with market share
behavior, the data shows that consumers do not respond stockpiling large quan-
tities when a brand is on sale. Behind this behavior there is the fact that, as with
all products that need refrigeration and have a relatively large size relative to its
price, refrigerated orange juice probably has a much higher storage opportunity
cost than products that can be stored in a closet or basement.
During the period covered by this sample, featuring of at least one brand
occurred 98.4% of the purchase occasions. Simultaneous featuring is a rare event
in this sample: simultaneous featuring occurred only 2.7% of the purchase occa-
sions. Since we want to identify the effect of single and simultaneous featuring
on choice set size choice, we used a large sample in order to avoid the event of a
sample with no multiple featuring in it. Table 4.4 shows the frequency of multiple
featuring in my sample.
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Table 4.4: Simultaneous Featuring Frequency
Variable Frequency Relative Frequency
0 Brands Featured 795 1.7%
1 Brand Featured 43936 95.6%
2 Brands Featured 926 2.0%
3 Brands Featured 318 0.7%
4 Brands Featured 0 0.0%
4.7 History and Stylized Facts in the Fresh Or-
ange Juice Market
The modern history of orange juice starts in 1954 when Tropicana introduced
flash pasteurization of juice, which extended the shelf life while retaining the
fresh taste. This allowed the company to expand its geographic market beyond
Florida (e.g., the market of New York upscale hotels). Until then, orange juice
drinkers outside the growing areas had only two options; they could mix frozen
concentrate with water or squeeze the oranges on their own.
Effectively, concentrated orange juice dates back to the early forties. The U.S.
Army was one of the first customers of this new product (in the form of powder
and concentrated syrup). The powder was first produced in 1945, following the
same process that the National Research Corporation of Boston, Massachusetts
(they would change its name to Florida Foods Corporation first and then to
The Minute Maid Company) had utilized for dehydrating penicillin among other
things.
After the WWII, and seeing its sales plunge, the company started exploring
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the potential of the product for the household market, trying different product
specifications. Finally, the chosen one was in the form of frozen orange juice
liquid concentrate, which was sold under the name Minute Maid.
In the late 40’s the brand had been nationally established, with Bing Crosby
advertising it in his radio broadcasts. In 1973, the company (already bought by
Coca Cola in 1960) introduced the ready-to-drink orange juice from concentrate.
Finally, in 1996 the product was further improved and started being sold as
Minute Maid Premium.
Florida’s Natural is a relatively recent player in the market for NFC orange
juice. The company history dates back to 1934, though its first inroad in the or-
ange juice market came when the company started producing concentrated orange
juice for the U.S. Army in 1943. The company did not launch its own consumer
brand until 1987, when they entered the household market with Florida’s Natu-
ral brand (a NFC orange juice). National recognition as a household brand was
secured in 1991, after the firm launched its first television ad campaign.
Finally, Stop’N’Shop store brand is called Sunrise Valley. It is made from
concentrate from Florida and Brazil oranges.
The main stylized facts in this market are:
• Tropicana is the leading national brand in the NFC segment of the market.
• Tropicana is leader in product development in the NFC segment of the
market.
• Minute Maid is the leading national brand in the FC segment of the market.
• Minute Maid is the leader in product development in the FC segment of
the market.
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• Ceteris paribus, the consumers perceive NFC juices as the highest quality
segment in this market.
• Florida’s Natural is the second national brand in the NFC segment of the
market, with a product line that replicates Tropicanas’.
• Florida oranges are the most praised among consumers.
• Ceteris paribus, Stop’n’Shop store brand should be regarded as the lowest
quality brand due to the fact that it is from concentrate and does not use
Florida oranges exclusively.
4.8 Estimation and Results
I estimate the models using Maximum Likelihood. Table 4.5 shows the results for
the three models compared against a standard Multinomial Logit specification.
Only the coefficients of the representative utility function and Sk are shown.
Coefficients with a double asterisk means that they are statistically significant at
the one percent level while a single asterisk means significance at the five percent
level.
A coefficient without asterisks means that the coefficient was not estimated
but is the result of a restriction introduced in the model’s specification. For
example, in models 1 and 2 each brand intercept was restricted to be equal in
both stages. In both cases we show the coefficients twice, in stage 1 and in stage
2, but we show the asterisks only once.
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Table 4.5: Estimation Results
Variables MNL Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
First Stage Brand Intercepts
F Natural - -1.27** -0.59** -2.79**
M Maid - -1.53** -0.71** -1.48**
Private Label - -0.76** -0.44** -0.90**
Tropicana - - - 0.12
Second Stage Brand Intercepts
F Natural -0.80** -1.27 -0.59 -0.16**
M Maid -1.13** -1.53 -0.76 -0.34**
Private Label -0.42** -0.76 -0.46 -0.06*
Tropicana - - - -
Marketing and Other Variables
Price -0.54** -0.96** -0.32** -0.22**
Feat 0.39** 8.87** 0.59** 0.85**
Price*Feat 0.37** -1.85** 0.18** -0.22**
Price*Size -0.18** -0.30** -0.11** -0.05**
Price*Fful -0.18** -0.56** -0.15** -0.12**
Price*Income 0.07** 0.13** 0.05** 0.01**
Choice Set Variables
Set(3,4)*Activity - 0.53** 0.76** 0.37**
Set(3,4)*Size - 0.20** -0.04 0.44**
Set(3,4)*Fful - -0.51** -0.32** 0.03
Set(3,4)*Income - -0.10** -0.89** -0.32**
- Log Likelihood 11030.7 10925.3 10918.1 10877.2
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4.8.1 Nested Models
The MNL model is nested in Model 1 (four restrictions) and Model 2 (seven
restrictions). Model 1 is nested in Model 2. Model 1 and 2 are not nested in
Model 3. Based on the likelihood ratio test (LR) we reject the MNL model in
favor of Model 1 and Model 2 (LR statistic for Model 1 vs. MNL is 210.6; LR
statistic for Model 2 vs. MNL is 225.2), and Model 1 in favor of Model 2 (LR
statistics for Model 1 vs. Model 2 is 14.4).
Rejection of the MNL model allows us to conclude that in any purchase occa-
sion a consumer will pick his preferred brand from a restricted set of alternatives,
instead of considering all the available options, with positive probability.
4.8.2 Non-Nested Models: Quality of Fit
As discussed in Guadagni and Little, probabilistic models pose special difficulties
in overall evaluation especially when the models are non-nested. I use here Mc-
Fadden’s likelihood ratio index, ρ, and Betancourt and Clague’s [7] measure of
predictive performance, I, as a quality of fit measure (for discussions on measures
of quality of fit see Greene pp. 831-834 [18], Guadagni and Little pp. 210-211
[20] and Betancourt and Clague pp. 86).
The likelihood ratio index is:
ρ2(m) = 1− L(m)
L(0)
where L(m) is the mean log likelihood of the model the researcher proposes,
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Table 4.6: Quality of Fit
Measure of Fit MNL Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
ρ 0.244 0.251 0.252 0.255
I 0.096 0.093 0.096 0.108
and L(0) is the mean log likelihood of the null model. When the null model is
the one that defines maximum entropy for the particular case, ρ2(m) describes
the fraction of uncertainty empirically explained by the model proposed by the
researcher relative to the null model. Here, the null is a Multinomial Logit Model
with only brand intercepts as explanatory variables.
Betancourt and Clague’s is a summary measure that scores each prediction
by giving it points not only in accordance with whether the prediction is right
or wrong but also in a way that reflects the degree of certainty of the prediction.
This measure penalizes incorrect predictions in the same way.For example, in the
dichotomous case, a higher score is given to a correct prediction that is close to 1
than to a correct prediction that is close to 0.5 and a lighter penalty is associated
to an incorrect prediction that is close to 0.5 than to an incorrect prediction that
is close to 1. The measure also includes a degrees-of-freedom correction that
penalizes specifications with more explanatory variables.
The fact that Model 3 best fits the data suggests that in deciding what alter-
natives to include in his choice set, a consumer sometimes does not use current
available marketing information about each available alternative. When it was
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assumed that, in the first stage, consumers used a strict subset of the available
information (Model 3) the model fitted better the sample information than when
it was assumed that consumers used all the available information (Model 2), even
after penalizing for the use of three more degrees of freedom.
4.8.3 Coefficients of Model 3
The coefficient for the dummy that takes value 1 when the brand is featured, β8,
takes a positive value. This suggests that consumers gain utility from a particular
brand being advertised. This is consistent with the works by Stigler and Becker
and Becker and Murphy and with all empirical works cited in this paper.
The value of the coefficient associated with the variable that captures the effect
of featuring on choice set choice is positive and statistically significant, which
suggests that featuring activity has a positive effect on search and evaluation
activity. This result is consistent with findings by Murthi and Srinivasan and
Ackerberg.
The estimated price coefficient is negative and statistically significant, as ex-
pected. The sign of the coefficients associated with the interaction between in-
come and price and income and choice set size indicate that consumers with
higher income are less sensitive to price changes and choose from smaller choice
sets. This result is consistent with the hypothesis that more affluent consumers
have higher opportunity costs associated to search.
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The size of the household has two effects: larger households are more sensitive
to price differentials than smaller ones, for any given choice set size, and are also
more prone to pick from equal or larger choice sets.
Finally, the set of households where the female head of household is working
full time is more price sensitive that its complement, for any choice set. The
effect on choice set size is statistically insignificant.
4.8.4 Robustness of the Results
The principal hypotheses consider the effect of featuring on the size of the set
of alternatives finally evaluated in all their attributes. I estimated a number
of different specifications in order to check the robustness of our results, three
of them are shown in Table 4.5. In addition, I show a variation of Model 3 in
Appendix F, where we interacted the variable with dummy variables that account
for the number of brands that were being featured at the moment of the purchase.
We refer to this specification as Model 4.
Model 4 fits the data as well as Model 3. Of all the interaction terms, the
only one that is positive and significant is the one associated with two brands
being simultaneously featured. The rest of the coefficients are positive but not
significant.
In the case of the interaction between the dummies that identify large choice
sets and purchase occasions when only one brand was featured, the coefficient
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is positive but relatively small and not significant. In this case I am inclined
to conclude that in the population there is not a positive effect from one-brand
featuring. In the case of the interaction between the dummies that identify large
choice sets and purchase occasions when two brands were featured, the coefficient
is positive, relatively large and significant. Finally, in the case of the interaction
between the dummies that identify large choice sets and purchase occasions when
three brands were featured, the coefficient is positive, the largest of all coefficients
but statistically insignificant. This leaves open the possibility that the effect is
positive in the population, but that we were unable to identify it due to the small
number of purchase occasions where three brands were simultaneously featured.
4.9 Marginal Effects and Elasticities: The Two
Faces of Featuring
In the next table I show the effects of simultaneous featuring on brand probability
and choice set probability. It is possible to see that when a brand is featured its
choice probability increases dramatically. Regarding the choice set probabilities
we see how larger choice sets see their probabilities increased when simultaneous
featuring takes place. The final effect on choice set probability is a function of :
• the effect of featuring on brand’s utility,
• the effect of featuring activity on choice set size, and
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• the weight associated to choice set that captures the level of correlation
among the alternatives inside that choice set.
Regarding the change in choice set probability when there is no featuring
versus when there is featuring it is interesting to note that, despite the positive
effect of featuring on choice set size, the choice set with Florida’s Natural as the
only element sees its probability increased after the simultaneous featuring. The
explanation comes from the fact that Florida’s Natural brand intercept when this
brand is not featured is negative and relatively large, meaning that this brand
suffers the most when it is not featured. As a consequence, the positive effect of
being featured on its utility and then on the utility of all choice sets that include it
is larger than the negative effect that featuring has on the probability associated
to choice sets of size one and two. The probabilities associated to small choice sets
for the remaining brands change in an expected way when simultaneous featuring
takes place.
When all brands are simultaneously featured, Model 3 boils down to the model
implemented by Swait. In this case and for a particular brand, an increment in
the probability associated with large choice sets that contain this brand will have
a positive impact in the marginal effect of price:
• the larger the weight of the large choice set, i.e. the larger the correlation
among the random terms
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Table 4.7: Effect of Featuring
No Featuring FN MM Featured All Featured
Brand Probability
P[FN] 0.132 0.473 0.173
P[MM] 0.094 0.313 0.105
P[PL] 0.420 0.130 0.496
P[Tr] 0.334 0.084 0.225
Choice Set Probability
ChS1: Tropic 0.100 0.045 0.026
ChS2: PL 0.051 0.023 0.034
ChS3: PL Tr 0.100 0.045 0.035
ChS4: MM 0.029 0.044 0.021
ChS5: MM Tr 0.100 0.050 0.027
ChS6: MM PLabel 0.051 0.044 0.035
ChS7: MM PLabel Tr 0.087 0.100 0.151
ChS8: FN 0.008 0.052 0.024
ChS9: FN Tr 0.100 0.055 0.028
ChS10: FN Plabel 0.051 0.052 0.035
ChS11: FN Plabel Tr 0.086 0.109 0.155
ChS12: FN MM 0.029 0.055 0.025
ChS13: FN MM Tr 0.083 0.120 0.128
ChS14: FN MM PL 0.045 0.109 0.147
ChS15: FN MM PL Tr 0.082 0.097 0.130
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• if the probability associated to large choice sets that contain this brand is
large,
• if the probability that this brand is chosen from the large choice set is close
to one half.
As the weight increases, the positive correlation among the random terms
increase. When this happens, the observed part of the utility becomes more
important as a determinant of brand choice. The second bullet says that the effect
of an increment in the probability associated to large choice sets that contain
the brand is increasing. Finally, all specifications derived from the standard
multinomial logit model share the property stated in the third bullet.
In the next table we show direct and cross price marginal effects and elas-
ticities, for a four-member household with an income of sixty-thousand dollars a
year and where the female head of household is not employed full-time, evaluated
at the average prices.
We can see that, when comparing No Feature against All Featured the direct
price elasticity of the probability for Florida’s Natural increases, in absolute value,
from –2.12 to –2.47, while the cross price elasticity of the probability for Florida’s
Natural with respect to Tropicana’s price decreases from 1.34 to 0.84.
In Model 3, the effect of price on brand utility is almost the same whether the
brand was featured or not. Thus, the changes seen in Table 4.8 in the direct and
cross marginal effects of the price on brand probability are explained exclusively
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Table 4.8: Direct and Cross Price Marginal Effects and Elasticities of Share
(Model 3)
No Feature No Feature All Featured All Featured
Mg. Effect Elasticity Mg. Effect Elasticity*
FNatural -0.107 -2.12 -0.125 -2.47
vs. MMaid 0.016 0.31 0.022 0.43
vs. PLabel 0.030 0.40 0.064 0.86
vs. Tropicana 0.062 1.34 0.039 0.84
MMaid -0.069 -1.87 -0.081 -2.19
vs. FNatural 0.016 0.44 0.022 0.61
vs. PLabel 0.015 0.28 0.036 0.68
vs. Tropicana 0.039 1.18 0.024 0.74
PLabel -0.113 -0.48 -0.189 -0.80
vs. FNatural 0.030 0.19 0.064 0.40
vs. MMaid 0.015 0.09 0.036 0.22
vs. Tropicana 0.068 0.46 0.089 0.60
Tropicana -0.168 -1.43 -0.152 -1.30
vs. FNatural 0.062 0.49 0.039 0.31
vs. MMaid 0.039 0.30 0.024 0.18
vs. PLabel 0.068 0.36 0.089 0.47
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by the increase in search activity, i.e. the increment in the size of the choice set
considered, on the part of the consumers.
The most obvious regularity we found is the increase in the cross price marginal
effects between any brand and the Private Label. In this particular case this reg-
ularity is consistent with the fact that featuring made more likely that consumers
consider choice sets including the Private Label and any of its competitors relative
to one element choice sets.
At the aggregate level and after simultaneous featuring, the sum of the marginal
effects and the elasticities (in absolute value) is close to twenty percent larger in
the case of the former and close to twelve percent larger in the case of the latter.
Then, we can conclude that featuring has a competition enhancing effect on this
category.
4.10 Summary of Findings and Economic Im-
plications
Regarding the questions discussed in the introduction, my findings suggest that in
any purchase occasion a consumer will pick his preferred brand from a restricted
set of alternatives, instead of searching all the available options, with positive
probability. Also, that in deciding what alternatives to include in the choice set,
sometimes consumers will not use current available marketing information about
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each available alternative. When it was assumed that in the first stage consumers
used a strict subset of the available information (Model 3) the model fitted better
the sample information than when it was assumed that consumers used all the
available information (Model 2) or nothing (Model 1). Finally, unlike the previous
literature, I was able to identify the effect of simultaneous featuring on the size
of the choice set searched. I found that, most probably, the information provided
through featuring affects positively the size of the choice set considered.
The fact that the informational effect increases with the number of brands
featured has important economic implications for each firm, especially the man-
ufacturers of the branded products. If we assume that in order for a retailer
to feature a brand he needs to obtain authorization from the manufacturer, the
informational and “prestige” effect could explain why simultaneous featuring is
such a rare event in this sample.
The prestige effect acts as a vertical characteristic, since it increases the utility
associated to the featured brand. If consumers’ valuation for the feature differs,
it could be profitable for the competing firms to differentiate from each other by
avoiding simultaneous featuring, in order to reduce competition among brands.
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Appendix A
Definition of Relevant Regions
A.1 Asymmetric Characteristics Competition and
Characteristic S Dominance
This case is characterized by the condition:
S1 − S2 ≥ D2 −D1 ≥ 0 (A.1)
A.1.1 Rs2
In order to be in region Rs2 it must be true that:
(w1 + x1) ∈ [(w1 + x1)n , (w1 + x1)m] (A.2)
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(w2 + x2) ∈ [(w2 + x2)n , (w2 + x2)m] (A.3)
It is easy to show that A.2 and A.3 hold if and only if S1−S2 ≥ D2−D1 ≥ 0.
Thus, Rs2 is the only region in which Assymmetric Characteristic Competition
and Charactersitic S Dominance is satisfied in equilibrium. Then we do not
need to calculate the equilibrium prices for regions Rs1 and Rs3 because the
equilibrium prices will violate the condition S1 − S2 ≥ D2 −D1 ≥ 0.
A.2 Assymetric Characteristics Competition and
Characteristic D Dominance
This case is characterized by the condition:
D2 −D1 ≥ S1 − S2 ≥ 0 (A.4)
A.2.1 Rd2
In order to be in region Rd2 it must be true that:
(w1 + x1) ∈ [(w1 + x1)m , (w1 + x1)n] (A.5)
(w2 + x2) ∈ [(w2 + x2)m , (w2 + x2)n] (A.6)
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It is easy to show that A.5 and A.6 hold if and only if 0 ≤ S1−S2 ≤ D2−D1.
Thus, Rd2 is the only region in which Assymmetric Characteristic Competition
and Charactersitic D Dominance is satisfied in equilibrium.
A.3 Dominated Characteristics Competition and
Characteristic S Dominance
This case is characterized by the condition:
S2 − S1 ≥ D2 −D1 ≥ 0 (A.7)
A.3.1 dRs1
In order to be in region dRs1 it must be true that:
(w1 + x1) ∈
[
(w1 + x1)




(w2 + x2) ∈
[
(w2 + x2)




It is easy to show that A.8 and A.9 hold if and only if 0 ≤ 2
3




In order to be in region dRs2 it must be true that:
(w1 + x1) ∈
[
(w1 + x1)




(w2 + x2) ∈
[
(w2 + x2)




It is easy to show that A.10 and A.11 hold if and only if 2
3
(S2 − S1) ≥ D2 −
D1 ≥ 0. From this and the previous condition, there cannot be a Dominated S
Characteristic price equilibrium in region dRs3.
A.4 Dominated Characteristics Competition and
Characteristic D Dominance
This case is characterized by the condition:
D2 −D1 ≥ S2 − S1 ≥ 0 (A.12)
A.4.1 dRd1
In order to be in region dRd1 it must be true that:
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(w1 + x1) ∈ [(w1 + x1)u , (w1 + x1)n] (A.13)
(w2 + x2) ∈ [(w2 + x2)u , (w2 + x2)n] (A.14)
It is easy to show that A.13 and A.14 hold if and only if 3
2
(S2 − S1) ≥ D2 −
D1 ≥ 0.
A.4.2 dRd2
In order to be in region dRd2 it must be true that:
(w1 + x1) ∈
[
(w1 + x1)




(w2 + x2) ∈
[
(w2 + x2)




It is easy to show that A.15 and A.16 hold if and only if 0 ≤ 3
2
(S2 − S1) ≤
D2 −D1.From this and the previous condition, there cannot be a Characteristic
D Dominance price equilibrium in region dRd3.
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Appendix B
Demands, Profit Functions and Price
Equilibria.
In this appendix I present the demand , profit functions and price equilibria for
each one of the relevant regions as defined in the Appendix A.










D1Rs3 = 1− (−D1+D2+w1−w2+x1−x2)
2
2(−D1+D2)(S1−S2)
D2Rs1 = 1− (S1−S2−w1+w2−x1+x2)
2
2(−D1+D2)(S1−S2)















ΠR2Rs2 = − (D1−D2−2(w1−w2+x1−x2))x22(S1−S2)
∂ΠR1Rs2
∂x2













= D1−D2−2w1+4w2−2x1+2x2−2S1+2S2 = 0








(D1 −D2 + 6S1 − 6S2), w2 = 110(−D1 + D2 + 4S1 − 4S2)














D2Rd1 = 1− (S1−S2−w1+w2−x1+x2)
2
2(−D1+D2)(S1−S2)











































(−4D1 + 4D2 + S1 − S2), w2 = 110(−6D1 + 6D2 − S1 + S2)
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D1dRs3 = 1− (−D1+D2−S1+S2+w1−w2+x1−x2)
2
2(−D1+D2)(−S1+S2)
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D1dRd3 = 1− (−D1+D2−S1+S2+w1−w2+x1−x2)
2
2(−D1+D2)(−S1+S2)
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Quality Equilibria
Updated Profit Functions in Each of the Relevant Regions



















































Retailer 1 Profits in Rd2








Retailer 2 Profits in Rd2







Manufacturer 1 Profits in Rd2
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Manufacturer 2 Profits in Rd2







Retailer 1 Profits in dRs2
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Retailer 2 Profits in dRs2
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Manufacturer 2 Profits in dRs2
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Retailer 1 Profits in dRd2








Retailer 2 Profits in dRd2







Manufacturer 1 Profits in dRd2







Manufacturer 2 Profits in dRd2









Proof of Proposition 2.1 and 2.2
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is a SPE of the game.








is a SPE of the game.
Proof:










. This results in zero profits.
In Rd2, since D2 − D1 ≥ S1 − S2 ≥ 0 then S1 is constrained to take the
value S1 = S. The best response for the retailer if to choose the lowest quality













In dRs1, S2−S1 ≥ D2−D1. From both firms’ FOCs, their best responses are
(S1, D1) = (S,D). However, for equilibrium prices to remain within this region, it













. When (S2 − S1) > 32 (D2 −D1),
to stay in this region the manufacturer 1 and the retailer 1 must choose and
D1 = D − 23
(








In dRs2, S2−S1 ≥ D2−D1. For the price equilibrium to be in dRs2 it must
be true that (S2 − S1) ≥ 32 (D2 −D1) ≥ 0. From the location’s FOCs we know
that profits increases for the manufacturer if S1 decreases and increases for the















In dRd1, from the FOCs we know that profit increases for each firm if they
decrease the quality level to the maximum extent possible. However, to remain
within this region, it must be true that 2
3
(D2 −D1) ≤ (S2 − S1). Complete
differentiation will take place if 2
3



















stay in this region the manufacturer 1 and the retailer 1 must choose D1 = D and
S1 = S − 23
(







In dRd2, the constraint for staying in the region does not bind. Then each
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D −D) and ΠR1 = 425
(
D −D).
















D −D) ≥ 4
25
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D −D) ≤ 4
25
(
S − S). Since the
second inequality implies the first in both cases, then Retailer 1 and Manufacturer
1 choose to differentiate incompletely always.





In Rs2, it must be true that S1 − S2 ≥ D2 − D1. From the FOCs, prof-





as long as S − S ≥ D − D. If this condition is not true,
the best response for Retailer 2, when manufacturer 2 chooses S2 = S, is to
choose D2 = D−
(
S − S). The profits associated with these responses are max-





D −D) and ΠR2 = 425
(
D −D) .
In Rd2, it must be true that D2 − D1 ≥ S1 − S2. From the FOCs, profits








D −D) and ΠR2 = 925
(
D −D)
In dRs1, since it must be true that S2 − S1 ≥ D2 − D1 and S2 − S1 ≤
3
2




and profits are zero for all firms.








and profits are zero for all firms.
In dRd1, it must be true that D2−D1 ≥ S2−S1.and 23 (D2 −D1) ≤ (S2 − S1).
From the FOCs, profits increase when S2 and D2 increase; however to remain in




. This results in profits
of zero for all firms (due to profit function form).
In dRd2, it must be true that D2−D1 ≥ S2−S1 and 23 (D2 −D1) > (S2 − S1).
From FOCs, profits increase whenever D2 and S2 increase. Thus, the best re-


















are always greater than the other
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In Rs2, it must be true that S1 − S2 ≥ D2 − D1. From the FOCs, profits





, which results in zero profits.
In Rd2, it must be true that D2 − D1 ≥ S1 − S2. From the FOCs, profits
increase when S2 and D2 increase; however to remain in the region the firms must
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(
S − S).
In dRd1, it must be true that D2−D1 ≥ S2−S1.and 23 (D2 −D1) ≤ (S2 − S1).
From the FOCs, profits increase when S2 and D2 increase; however to remain in
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of zero for all firms (due to profit function form).
In dRd2, it must be true that D2−D1 ≥ S2−S1 and 23 (D2 −D1) > (S2 − S1).
From FOCs, profits increase whenever D2 and S2 increase. However to remain
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zero profits for all firms (due to profit function form). Thus, the best responses





















Proof of Proposition 3.1
Let
Pjr = wj + xr j = 1, 2; r = 1, 2
Where wj is the wholesale price charged by manufacturer j and xr is the
mark-up charged by retailer r. A consumer i who buys good 1 from retailer 1
must satisfy:
θSi S1 + θ
D
i D1 − P11 ≥ θSi S1 + θDi D2 − P12 (D.1)
θSi S1 + θ
D
i D1 − P11 ≥ θSi S2 + θDi D1 − P21 (D.2)
θSi S1 + θ
D
i D1 − P11 ≥ θSi S2 + θDi D2 − P22 (D.3)










(w2 + x2)− (w1 + x1)− θDi (D2 −D1)
D2 −D1
It is easy to show that when the two first inequalities hold, the third holds
too. This is a result driven by the assumption stating that each retailer charges
a uniform mark-up on each good. Then, we are allowed to derive the aggregate






























1− x2 − x1
D2 −D1
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Since the demand that retailer 1 faces is (AD11 + AD21) and he charges the








Profit functions for the rest of the firms are derived in the same way:
ΠR2 = x2
(
















By inspection, we can see that retailer 1’s profit do not depend on wholesale
prices or good quality. In the second stage, each retailer and manufacturer reac-
tion function is derived from its FOC. Then, we solve for the NE in prices given
















(S2 − S1) (D.15)
We update each firm’s profit function and let each manufacturer and retailer




























Proof of Proposition 3.2
Let us assume, without loss of generality, that manufacturer 2 and retailer 2 are
the high quality firms: D2 > D1, S2 > S1 and that P22 − P21 > P12 − P11 > 0
where P12 is the price charged on the good from manufacturer 1 and retailer 2.
Then, demand functions are:
AD11 =
(
(x12 + w12)− (x11 + w11)
D2 −D1
)(




− (x22 + w22 + x11 + w11 − x12 − w12 − x21 − w21)
2
2 (D2 −D1) (S2 − S1)
AD21 =
(
(x22 + w22)− (x21 + w21)
D2 −D1
)(






1− (x12 + w12)− (x11 + w11)
D2 −D1
)(







1− (x22 + w22)− (x21 + w21)
D2 −D1
)(





− (x22 + w22 + x11 + w11 − x12 − w12 − x21 − w21)
2
2 (D2 −D1) (S2 − S1)
Let us replace this demand functions into the profit functions of retailers and
manufacturers. I prove that, at stage 2, each supplier does not have an incentive
to deviate from charging the same whoelsale price to both retailer and that each
retailer does not have an incentive to deviate from charging the same mark-
up on the goods from both manufacturers. Because the pricing game played
is symmetric for manufacturers and retailers we only need to derive the best
responses for the manufacturers or the retailers.
Profit functions for retailer 1 (retailer 2), given what retailer 2 (retailer 1),
manufacturer 1 and manufacturer 2 charge, are:
ΠR1 =
9 (x11 − x21)2 (x11 + 2x21) + 6 (S1 − S2) (x211 + 2x221)




3 (x11 − x21)2 + (S1 − S2) (x11 + 2x21)
)
18 (D1 −D2) (S1 − S2)
ΠR2 =
9 (x12 − x22)2 (2x12 + x22) + 6 (S1 − S2) (x212 + 2x222)




3 (x12 − x22)2 + (S1 − S2) (x12 + 2x22)
)
18 (D1 −D2) (S1 − S2)
97
From the FOCs with respect to its own mark-ups, we solve for the best re-
sponse function under the assumption that the strategy of the other players is to
charge uniform mark-ups and wholesale prices. For retailer 1, the critical point
vectors are:












−3 (D2 −D1)− 4 (S2 − S1)
)
(E.8)
x21 = − 2
27
(














−3 (D2 −D1)− 4 (S2 − S1)
)
(E.9)
x21 = − 2
27
(




−3 (D2 −D1)− 4 (S2 − S1)
)
For retailer 2, the critical point vectors are:





x12 = − 1
54
(




24 (D1 −D2) + 25 (S1 − S2)
)
(E.11)
x22 = − 1
54
(




24 (D1 −D2) + 25 (S1 − S2)
)
x12 = − 1
54
(




24 (D1 −D2) + 25 (S1 − S2)
)
(E.12)
x22 = − 1
54
(




24 (D1 −D2) + 25 (S1 − S2)
)
The second order conditions for a local maximum only hold for (36) and (39).
Then, for each retailer, charging a uniform additive mark-up on both manufac-
turers’ goods is Sub-Game Perfect Equilibrium. By symmetry, the same happens
to the manufacturers.
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Table F.1: Estimation Results
Variables Model 4
























- Log Likelihood 10876.4
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